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OLD REGULATORY WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE OF 
TECHNOLOGY—— A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S 
SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM 
Bi Honghai† 
In 2014, the Chinese government launched a comprehensive 
“Outline for the Construction of Social Credit System” (hereinafter 
“OCSCS”) and plans to build a credit reporting system covering the 
whole society by 2020.1  The two key elements of this Chinese social 
credit system are the keeping, sharing, and evaluating of credit 
records and various incentive mechanisms, which include rewards 
and punishments.2  In order to advance this system, two agencies of 
the central government, the National Development and Reform 
Commission and the People’s Bank of China, have organized model-
building pilot programs in 43 cities and urban areas nationwide since 
2015, covering governments of sub-provincial cities, prefecture-level 
cities, county-level cities, and districts of cities.  By the beginning of 
2018, a list of 12 model cities for social credit system engineering 
was identified and publicized.3   Since then, this system has been 
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the Planning Outline for the Establishment of a Social Credit System (2014–
2020)], GUOFA [2014] No. 21, June 27, 2014, 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-06/27/content_8913.htm 
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 2 Id. at §§ IV, V. 
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expanded nationwide, local regulations and rules have been enacted, 
and more have been drafted and published for comment in various 
provinces.  Some of the essential documents are available in English, 
though not the official versions.4 
The social credit system has attracted great attention inside 
and outside China, but for quite different reasons.  The most 
important concern in the countries outside of China is the union of an 
authoritarian regime and information technology, which means the 
system could be used to further monitor society, leading to an 
Orwellian State, or at least to the eve of 1984.5  In the American 
context, China’s social credit system is easily reminiscent of the 
dystopian TV series Black Mirror (“Nosedive,” episode one of the 
third season).  This kind of concern leads to many criticisms of 
China’s social credit system based on futuristic visions rather than the 
existing implementation.  Of course, such privacy concerns due to 
technology-centralism and big data-driven algorithm governance also 
exist in the United States, such as the NSA’s monitoring of citizen 
communications as revealed by Edward Snowden and 
Facebook/Cambridge Analytica’s notorious use of personal 
information.  The use of new technologies for surveillance and data 
analysis has triggered a form of criticism called “Turnkey 
Totalitarianism.”6  In contrast, it is reported that the support of the 
Chinese people for this system is rather high.7  It is worth noting that 




 4 See generally Legal Documents Related to the Social Credit System, CHINA 
L. TRANSLATE, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/social-credit-documents/ 
[https://perma.cc/DZT2-FU24] (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). 
 5 Celia Hatton, China ‘Social Credit’: Beijing Sets Up Huge System, BBC 
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34592186  
[https://perma.cc?FX6U-26XU]; Big Data, Meet Big Brother: China Invents the 
Digital Totalitarian State, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 17, 2016),  
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/12/17/china-invents-the-digital-
totalitarian-state/ [https://perma.cc/H5B9-W63H]. 
 6 Rick Perlstein, He’s Making A List: Trump Is More Paranoid and 
Dangerous Than Nixon, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 2, 2017), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/138911/hes-making-list-trump-paranoid-
dangerous-nixon/ [https://perma.cc/RPB5-HWDU]. 
 7 Genia Kostka, China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: 
Explaining High Levels of Approval, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1, 11–12 (2019). 
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by Black Mirror,8 and the Chinese have quite high expectations for 
what the system can achieve in the context of regulation. 
It is precisely confusing the future with reality that has led to 
some misplaced criticism.  In order to clarify the true meaning of the 
social credit system, this paper first describes the general context and 
content of the social credit system being built in China.  It then 
distinguishes the two kinds of social credit: market credit and public 
credit.  The confusion between the two kinds of social credit is at the 
root of some misplaced criticism.  This paper further divides the 
social credit system into a two-level structure: one is technical, the 
other is regulatory.  It is more accurate to describe China’s current 
social credit system as old wine in a new bottle.  The old wine refers 
to the regulatory level, namely the social credit system is just another 
kind of “mundane regulatory law,”9 used to solve some persistent 
problems.  It is more like a background investigation during the 
process of public decision-making, similar to the workings of market 
credit, which will check the financial capacities and economic 
activities of the credit subject.  The new bottle refers to the 
technological level, namely the recent developments of IT that have 
made social credit engineering much easier.  The technology itself 
has given rise to many concerns that need to be addressed.  However, 
this paper argues that although it may be unremarkable as a regulatory 
measure, changes in technology have given new content to the 
regulatory side of the social credit system and created new legal 
problems that need to be dealt with. 
The paper is divided into four parts.  The first part outlines the 
background and content of China’s current social credit system.  It 
shows that China’s current social credit engineering is mainly about 
public credit.  What the system is trying to solve is the lack of 
 
 8 Jamie P. Horsley, China’s Orwellian Social Credit Score Isn’t Real, 
BROOKINGS (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2018/11/19/chinas-orwellian-social-credit-score-isnt-real/ 
[https://perma.cc/X7R3-G4TJ]; Jeremy Baum, Social Credit Overview Podcast, 
CHINA L. TRANSLATE (Oct. 31, 2018),  
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/social-credit-overview-podcast/?lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/7FMD-526C]; Bing Song, The West May Be Wrong About 
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integrity (trust) in Chinese society.  The second part analyzes the 
structure of the social credit system from two levels, technical and 
regulatory.  The technical level of social credit system covers the 
whole process from input of credit information (data collection) to 
output of credit evaluation (social credit grades and black lists).  The 
regulatory level of social credit engineering refers to the legal 
implications of credit evaluation.  Based on the local practices across 
China, different models of data collection and social credit grades 
have different legal implications.  The first level of this structure can 
be extended one step backward to include the infrastructure of the 
social credit system, and one step forward to include publicity and 
repair of social credit.  The third part of the paper discusses the 
problems and solutions of the technical level, points out the problems 
with data collection and algorithms, and argues that the potential of 
reconstructing citizens’ “status” based on social credit grades poses 
serious challenges with respect to human dignity.  The fourth part 
discusses problems with the social credit system as a means of 
regulation in and of itself due to the technological change. 
I. ORIGINS AND A NEW STARTING POINT: THE 
BACKGROUND AND CONTENT OF THE SOCIAL CREDIT 
SYSTEM 
As far as the formal institution is concerned, the Chinese 
government’s attention to social credit began as early as the turn of 
the new century.  Social credit at this point was mainly understood as 
market credit, the end of which was to ensure the security of 
economic transactions. 10   However, since 2011–2012, the 
understanding of social credit in the official documents and the 
discourse has undergone a dramatic change. 11   The social credit 
 
 10 Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de Ruogan 
Yijian Guobanfa (2007) No.17 (国务院办公厅关于社会信用体系建设的若干意
见国办发〔2007〕17 号) [2007 Several Opinions of The General Office of The 
State Council on The Construction of The Social Credit System No.17] 
(promulgated by St. Council, Mar. 23, 2007, effective Mar. 28, 2008), ST. COUNCIL 
GAZ., Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-04/02/content_569314.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3H98-NWHZ] (China). 
 11 The Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee proposed 
the four major areas of the social credit system for the first time, and the Report of 
the 18th National Congress inherited this formulation and continued to be the 
planning outline for 2014.  Hu Jintao zai Zhongguo Guochandang di Shibai ci 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/4
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system has been developed to address doubts in integrity and mistrust 
in society at large.  Since 2012, the social credit system has been 
regarded as an important form of social governance innovation.12  It 
is also considered the embodiment of socialist core values at the 
institutional level and has been incorporated into legislative planning, 
with the goal of strengthening civil morality.13  By the end of 2020, 
at least 35 statutes and 42 administrative regulations have clauses 
related to the social credit system and the draft of Social Credit Law 
has been formulated. 14   Alongside institutionalization, the social 
credit system has multiplied the amount of data gathered and has 
become a rather comprehensive regulatory mechanism. 
1. Returning to the Origin of Integrity 
In the view of Chinese scholars, the credit system of the 
Western countries (sometimes also referred to as social credit) is 
mainly about economic transactions and financial activities.15  The 
 
Quanguo Daibiao Dahui shang de Baogao (胡锦涛在中国共产党第十八次全国
代表大会上的报告) [Hu Jintao’s Report at the 18th National Congress of The 
Communist Party of China], XINHUA NEWS, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com//18cpcnc/2012-11/17/c_113711665_7.htm 
[perma.cc/Z6MA-9NLB] (explaining that the overall improvement of citizens’ 
morality included strengthening government integrity, business integrity, social 
integrity, and the construction of judicial credibility). 
 12 Jiang Bixin(江必新), Yi Dang de Shijiuda Jingshen wei Zhidao, Jiaqiang 
he Chuangxin Shehui Zhili (以党的十九大精神为指导，加强和创新社会治理) 
[Strengthen and Innovate Social Governance guided by the 19th CPC National 
Congress], 1 J. CHINESE ACAD. GOVERNANCE 23–29, 26 (2018). 
 13 Zhonggong Zhongyang Yinfa Shehuizhuyi Hexin Jiazhiguan Rongru Fazhi 
Jianshe Lifa Xiufa Guihua (中共中央印发《社会主义核心价值观融入法治建
设立法修法规划》) [The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
Planning of The Integration of Socialist Core Values into The Enactment and 
Amendment of Legislation in The Construction of Rule of Law], XINHUA NEWS 
(May 7, 2018),  
http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-05/07/c_1122796215.htm [perma.cc/4S8J-
9PE4]. 
       14 Guojia Fazhang Gaige Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Zhaokai Shehuixinyong Lifa 
Zhuanti Yantaohui (国家发展改革委组织召开社会信用立法专题研讨会) [The 
National Development and Reform Commission organized seminars on social 
credit legislation], CREDIT CHINA (Dec. 16, 2020), 
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/home/lfdt/202012/t20201215_220505.html 
[https://perma.cc/KB69-5DKV]. 
 15 When Chinese scholars introduce the social credit systems from the other 
countries, they usually refer to the credit systems in the economic and financial 
fields. For example, Zhao Rui (赵锐), Woguo Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de 
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essence of this system is risk management of transactions, in contrast 
to social integrity or social trust, which are solved by the 
establishment of legal and moral mechanisms. 16   In addition to 
market credit, China’s social credit system addresses the lack of 
integrity in a rapidly transforming society.  As a result, though it 
includes the term “credit,” this system is not based on economic credit 
as understood in western countries.  Rather, China’s social credit is 
derived from integrity, reputation,17 and trust,18 the scope of which 
goes far beyond market credit. 
Historically, integrity has always been regarded as a core 
component of traditional Chinese culture.  “Integrity” is one of the 
“five virtues” of the individuals in the doctrines of Confucianism.  
There is a maxim in “The Analects:” “If a man does not keep his word, 
what is he good for?”  In interpersonal communication: “a promise is 
worth a thousand ounces of gold.”  In business, a common phrase 
assures: “we are equally honest even with children and aged 
customers.”  Even in the agricultural society of pre-modern China, 
merchants, who were at the bottom of the four estates (“scholar, 
farmer, artisan, and merchant”), were associated with the reputation 
“no fraud, no business.”  In the process of transforming from an 
agricultural society to an industrial and post-industrial society—and 
also from a society of acquaintances to a society of strangers—the 
creation of a social credit system is seen not only as a form of 
insurance for economic transactions, but also as an integral element 
to restore integrity into China’s cultural fabric.  In this regard, social 
credit in the context of contemporary China includes the two essential 
 
Tantao—Pouxi Jiejian Deguo SCHUFA de Shehui Xinyong Tixi (我国社会信用
体系建设的探讨—剖析、借鉴德国 SCHUFA 的社会信用体系) [Discussion on 
the Construction of China’s Social Credit System—Analysis and Reference to the 
Social Credit System of SCHUFA in Germany], 4 E-GOVERNMENT 84, 84–93 
(2017); Dong Caisheng (董才生), Meiguo Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de 
Jingyan Jiaoxun dui Woguo de Qishi (美国社会信用体系建设的经验教训对我
国的启示) [Experiences and Lessons for China Revelation from the American 
Social Credit System], 17 NORTHEAST ASIA F. 39, 39–42(2008). 
 16 Han Jiaping (韩家平), Zhongguo Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de Tedian 
yu Qushi Fenxi (中国社会信用体系建设的特点与趋势分析) [Analysis of the 
Characteristics and Trends of China’s Social Credit System Construction], 5 
CREDIT REF. 1, 1–5 (2018). 
 17 Xin Dai, Toward a Reputation State: The Social Credit System Project of 
China 5–7 (June 10, 2018),  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3193577 
[http://perma.cc/WU7Q-BTRN]. 
 18 Yu-Jie Chen et al., “Rule of Trust:” The Power and Perils of China’s 
Social Credit Megaproject, 32 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2–3 (2018). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/4
288 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 16 
 
meanings of “integrity:” the first is honesty, which means seeking 
truth from facts and not deceiving; the second is keeping promises.  
These two aspects are the basic requirements of a trust-based society, 
including but not limited to activities in the market.19 
2. Lack of Integrity: Transition from a Society of Acquaintances to 
One of Strangers 
Integrity within an acquaintance-based society rests on known 
personal character.  There are consequences when an individual is 
dishonest, such as a tarnished reputation that affects the 
neighborhood relationships.  The transition from a society of 
acquaintances to a society of strangers calls for a new way of 
determining the trustworthiness of its members, namely through seals 
of approval. 20   Over the years, these mechanisms have included 
contracts in the industrial age, digital systems in the information 
age,21 and now distributed ledger technologies such as blockchain 
and smart contracts, which are used as potential transaction 
guarantees in an ever more anonymous internet world. 
When social credit was first proposed in China, it was mainly 
to address economic concerns.  As early as the 1980s, the principle 
of integrity was enshrined in the General Principles of Civil Law.22  
Later on, social credit was mainly used to address problems of state-
owned enterprises unable to repay their loans and small businesses 
unable to obtain loans from banks.  Therefore, even before entering 
the 21st century, China had accelerated the construction of a credit 
reporting system.23  In 1997 and 1999, the People’s Bank of China 
 
 19 Zhang Yaguang (张亚光), Jindai Xinyong Jianguan Tixi de Sixiang Zhidu 
yu Jingyan Qishi (张亚光) [Ideological System and Experience Enlightenment of 
Modern Credit Supervision System], http://www.aisixiang.com/data/110618.html 
[perma.cc/9JT6-LD3M]. 
 20 Jeremy Shearmur & Daniel B. Klein, Good Conduct in the Great Society: 
Adam Smith and the Role of Reputation, in REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE 
VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT 29–45 (Daniel B. Klein eds., Univ. 
of Michigan Press 1997). 
 21 Han, supra note 16, at 5. 
 22 Article 4 reads: “In civil activities, the principles of voluntariness, fairness, 
making compensation for equal value, honesty and credibility shall be observed.” 
General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, (promulgated 
by Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) (Lawinfochina). 
 23 In 2001, the Economic and Trade Commission of State Council jointly 
issued the “Notice on Strengthening the Credit Management of SMEs” with 10 
ministries and commissions. 
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launched the basic databases of corporate credit reporting and 
personal credit reporting.  The two databases have been online for 
reference since 2006. 24   Government agencies also announced a 
series of “blacklists,” including a list of discredited companies that 
failed to pay their debts.  The theoretical presumption during this 
period was that the market economy was based on a credit economy, 
thus the major concern was financial creditworthiness, with the goal 
of safeguarding economic transactions, expanding the market, and 
reducing transaction costs.25 
However, with rapid economic development and social 
transformation, social credit in China has expanded its scope to 
embrace every aspects of the social life.26  The OCSCS now describes 
the social credit system as helping to prevent: “grave production 
safety accidents, food and drug security incidents . . .  commercial 
swindles, production and sales of counterfeit products, tax evasion, 
fraudulent financial claims, academic impropriety and other such 
phenomena [that] cannot be stopped in spite of repeated bans.”27  
According to the OCSCS, lack of integrity is not only a problem of 
personal virtue, but also a problem of social governance; the general 
level of integrity should be enhanced not only through education, but 
also through the authority and effectiveness of the regime itself.  
Therefore, China’s social credit engineering has greater ambitions.  
Besides market credit, the most important aspect of the system is 
obeying laws and rules and keeping promises.  At the same time, 
government integrity and judicial credibility is a function of 
 
 24 Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Zhengxin Zhongxin (中国人民银行征信中
心) [CREDIT REFERENCE CENTER], THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, 
https://ipcrs.pbccrc.org.cn/ [https://perma.cc/63FM-JRRU]. 
 25 Lin Yifu (林毅夫), Jianli Quanguo Tongyi de Shehui Xinyong Tixi (中国
人民银行征信中心) [Establish A National Unified Social Credit System], 
RENMINWANG (人民网) [PEOPLE.COM] (Mar. 7, 2002, 4:09 PM),  
http://www1.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/7501/7506/20020307/681866.html 
[perma.cc/NT4J-HYYG]. 
 26 Ouyang Haiyan (中国人民银行征信中心), 2011 Zhongguoren Xinyong 
Da Diaocha: Chengxin Weiji Citong Zhongguo (中国人民银行征信中心) [2011 
Chinese People’s Credit Survey: Integrity Crisis Stings China], in 8 XIAO KANG 
INDEX OF CHINESE CREDIT (中国信用小康指数) 48–52 (2011). 
 27 Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao (2014–2020) (社会信用体
系建设规划纲要(2014–2020)) [State Council Notice Concerning Issuance of the 
Planning Outline for the Establishment of a Social Credit System (2014–2020)], 
GUOFA [2014] No. 21, June 27, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-
06/27/content_8913.htm [https://perma.cc/UW63-Y4S7] (China). 
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institutional authority and effectiveness. As it is stated in OCSCS, 
these two are far from meeting the expectations of the general public. 
Therefore, it is correct to say that the social credit system is a 
regulatory measure.28  Market credit in the financial field is based on 
evaluation of economic capabilities and thus provides a basis for the 
decision-making of market players.  Social credit, by contrast, 
especially public credit, aims to confront society’s lack of integrity 
by incorporating credibility evaluations of individuals and 
organizations into the decision-making process of public agencies.  
Of course, this does not mean that there is only one single interest at 
play behind the social credit system.  In fact, the dynamics among 
interests involved are rather complicated.29 
3. From Market Credit to Public Credit: A New Starting Point 
In order to establish social trust, it is necessary to reduce 
uncertainties in communication and asymmetries of information.  For 
that end, the integrity of both public and private entities, including 
the trustworthiness of authorities, is crucial to the establishment of 
social trust.  Therefore, it is not correct to say China’s social credit 
system is a top-down government control mechanism (monitoring 
society).  It is rather promoting trust within society as a whole.  To 
that end, the public credit system includes assessments of the 
credibility of public institutions themselves, namely governmental 
integrity and judicial credibility. 
Governmental integrity requires that the principle of integrity 
be applied in the operation of public administration.  Governmental 
integrity above all means policies of a state should be stable and 
consistent so that the private parties can reasonably plan their 
activities.  As a matter of fact, policy instability is considered one of 
the biggest sources of risk facing economic and social development 
in China.  This has long been recognized both in theory and in 
practice. 30   As early as 2004, the State Council has recognized 
honesty and credibility as the basic requirements for public 
 
 28 Baum, supra note 8. 
 29 Dai, supra note 17, pt. iv. 
 30 Li Song, The Problem of Lack of Integrity in China’s Society is 
Highlighted, Scholars Say the Primary Responsibility Rests with the Government 
(July 25, 2011), http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2011-07-25/105222871856.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/5YL8-4E97]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
2021] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 291 
 
administration according to law (rule of administrative law).31  The 
scope of honesty and credibility includes two aspects. The first 
concerns information disclosure, namely that the information 
disclosed by administrative agencies should be complete, accurate, 
and true.  This requirement intends to solve the problem of 
information disclosure  and access during interactions between 
private and public parties.  The second aspect is to protect the 
legitimate expectations of private parties through predictable 
application of policies.  Without good cause and passing through 
proper legal procedure, administrative agencies cannot revoke or 
change administrative decisions that have already been in effect; if an 
administrative decision needs to be revoked or changed due to 
national interests, public interests, or other legal causes, that decision 
shall be made according to appropriate legal authority and procedures, 
and any property loss thus suffered by a private party shall be 
compensated according to law.32  This requirement is to enhance the 
stability and predictability of policy and administrative decision-
making.  Ten years later, the OCSCS further expanded the concept of 
governmental integrity to include the principle of public 
administration according to law itself (rule of administrative law), 
with the focus on honoring agreements and keeping service 
commitments, such as implementation of economic and social 
development aspirations, as well as keeping commitments in 
handling affairs of the general public.  The integrity of civil servants 
is also an integral part of governmental integrity. 33 Although the 
central government is working hard to enhance the level of 
governmental integrity in all localities, its evaluation obviously 
depends on the institutional guarantee of legal liability, political 
accountability, and administrative responsibility, and cannot be 
evaluated through simple index and points diagrams. 34The various 
 
 31 Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa Quanmian Tuijin Yifaxingzheng Shishi 
Gangyao de Tongzhi (国务院关于印发全面推进依法行政实施纲要的通
知)[State Council Notice Concerning Issuance of the Outlines of Comprehensive 
Promotion of the Implementation of Rule of Law], GUOFA [2004] No. 10. 
     32 Id. at § III, 5. 
     33 Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao (2014–2020), supra note 1, at   
§ II (1). 
     34 There are various practical efforts to index the level of rule of administrative 
law across China.  The leading effort at provincial level first introduced by 
Shenzhen in 2008, and Guangdong issued a province-wide index system in 2013, 
Guangdong Province Rule of Law Based Government Construction Index System 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss2/4
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methods of evaluation of governmental integrity introduced in the 
process of building the government under the rule of law are hard to 
be satisfactory. 
The extent to which judicial judgments can be enforced, upon 
which the effectiveness of the judicial system is based, is also an 
important guarantee for social trust.  With widespread enforcement 
deficits, the certainty and predictability of the rights and obligations 
of the parties not only cannot guarantee, but also will severely weaken 
trust in the system, which in turn will affect the integrity of the parties.  
Therefore, judicial credibility is also an important part of the social 
credit system in China.  In order to resolve the enforcement deficits, 
the list of “discredited debtors”35 and joint punishments (see Part II)36 
 
(广东省法治政府建设指标体系), Guangdong Government Order [2013] 
No.184.  The national-wide effort is Model Index System for Municipality and 
County Rule of Law Based Government Construction issued by the Office of the 
Central Committee for the Rule of Law (中央全面依法治国委员会办公室)，
Legal Daily, May 24, 2019, page 2.  This practice has been based on academic 
arguments that rule of law can be first realized in some certain local areas and 
reports of rule of law index. See generally ZHONGGUO FAZHI ZHISHU BAOGAO: 
YUHANG DE JINGYAN (2007–2011) (中国法治指数报告:余杭的实验 (2007–
2011)) [The Report of China Rule of Law Index: Experiment in Yuhang (2007–
2011)] (Qian Hongdao (钱弘道) ed., China Social Sciences Press, 2012); QIAN 
HONGDAO (钱弘道), FAZHI PINGGU DE SHIYAN: YUHANG DE ANLI (法治评估的
实验: 余杭的案例) [Experiment in Evaluation of Rule of Law: The Case of 
Yuhang] (Law Press, 2013). 
 35 In July 2013, the Supreme People’s Court issued the “Several Provisions 
on the Publication of List of Discredited Debtors.”  A discredited debtor is one 
who has the ability but refuses to fulfill the obligations set out in the effective 
legal instrument, and has one of the following circumstances: (1) obstructing or 
resisting enforcement by means of falsification of evidence, violence, threats, etc.; 
(2) avoiding enforcement by false lawsuit, false arbitration, or by concealing or 
transferring property; (3) violating the property reporting system; (4) violating the 
restrictions on high consumption orders; (5) the debtor refuses to fulfill without 
justifiable reasons; (6) others who have the ability but refuse to fulfill the 
obligations of the effective legal instrument.  However, for those parties who are 
actually unable to fulfill, the court will also place them on the list of “discredited 
debtors,” and thus restrict them from high consumption.  This situation is 
obviously different from those who have the ability but refuse to fulfill the 
obligations.  For the list of discredited debtors, please refer to The Supreme 
People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://shixin.court.gov.cn/index.html [https://perma.cc/5J4D-47KC]. 
 36 Li Fei, Joint Credit Punishment System and Credit Society Construction, 
CHINA COURT (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/06/id/3362513.shtml  
[https://perma.cc/W872-KFZX]. 
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introduced by courts are important templates for the social credit 
system (see Part II for the restrictive measures for those on the list). 
Social credit of private entities includes public credit and 
market credit.  Public credit is established by the public agencies, 
with the identity, qualifications, administrative management, and 
judicial information of the market entities as the main content, with 
classified regulation and joint rewards and punishments as the main 
regulatory methods.  The essence of public credit is the regulation of 
market entities based on credit and the public resources will be 
allocated with credit as criteria, the end of which aims to solve the 
lack of social integrity.37  The collection of public credit information 
is mandatory.  In terms of information collection, the government can 
collect itself or outsource the service.  To the contrary, market credit 
is established by various private institutions, including industry 
organizations and third-party credit services.  The main contents of 
market credit are transaction records and credit evaluation 
information, which may affect the selection of economic transactions 
and the allocation of market resources.38  The collection of market 
information requires consent from the market entities.  As for current 
social credit systems developed in various local areas, the chief focus 
is invariably on public credit;39 the market credit system will follow 
the provisions of the Regulations on the Administration of Credit 
Information (effective as of March 15, 2013) and the responsible 
agency at the national level is People’s Bank of China, while the 
coordinating agency of the public credit system is the National 
Development and Reform Commission. 
Market credit is currently regarded as a part of the social 
credit system.  The media, domestic or foreign, often confuses market 
credit with public credit. This has led to very serious 
misunderstandings, 40  at least in the very early stages when the 
 
 37 Han, supra note 16, at 3. 
 38 Id. 
 39 For example, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Henan, Fujian, Jilin, Liaoning, Shanxi, 
Ningxia, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Shandong, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, etc. all passed or 
are preparing to pass local regulations or local government rules for public credit 
information; Inner Mongolia, Hubei, Hebei, and Guangdong have both public 
credit information and market credit information regulations or rules, but public 
credit information is the main content. 
 40 Nadra Nittle, Spend “Frivolously” and be Penalized under China’s New 
Social Credit System, VOX (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-
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outlines of the system were still being shaped.  For example, Sesame 
Credit, which is widely covered by the Western media and used to 
describe China’s social credit system, 41  is a private entity that 
investigates and collects the credit information of market entities.  
Sesame Credit is one of the eight pilot social credit investigation 
entities authorized by the People’s Bank of China in 2015. 42 
However, due to many shortcomings, the eight entities, including 
Sesame Credit, did not meet the criteria of the central bank and were 
not awarded license of social credit business. 43 Market credit 
certainly plays an important role in regulating the behavior of market 
players.  However, given the differences in their content and function, 
the main focus of this paper is on public credit, which is also the latest, 
if not the most novel development of the social credit system.  Of 
course, the social credit system is still evolving.  Whether the two are 
to be integrated  and incorporated under one comprehensive social 
credit evaluation framework remains to be seen.  Given the huge 
economic benefits involved, private credit entities do not have strong 
incentives to share their own credit data with each other and the 




 41 Zhima Xinyong de Xinyong Weiji: Weishenme Bei Yuetan? Mafan de 
Genyuan Shishenme? (芝麻信用的信用危机: 为什么被约谈? 麻烦的根源是什
么?) [The Credit Crisis of Sesame Credit: Why is it Being Interviewed? What is 
the Source of Trouble?], SOHU NEWS (Jan. 15, 2018), 
http://www.sohu.com/a/216748129_226049 [https://perma.cc/LW9S-ECF8]. 
      42 The People’s Bank of China, Guanyu Zuohao Geren Zhengxin Yewu 
Zhunbei Gongzuo de Tongzhi (关于做好个人征信业务准备工作的通知) 
[Notice on Preparing for Personal Credit Investigation], 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-01/05/content_2800381.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S6TV-MGAE]. 
      43 For the remarks of the Director of the Credit Investigation Bureau of the 
People’s Bank of China, see Ba Jia Geren Zhengxin Jigou, Jing Meiyou Yijia 
Hege? (8 家个人征信机构，竟没有一家合格? ) [None of the Eight Person 
Credit Investigation Organizations is in Compliance], SOHU NEWS (Apr. 24, 
2017), https://www.sohu.com/a/136098197_673963 [https://perma.cc/YPT8-
G948]. A license was finally awarded to a newly registered corporation Baihang 
Credit (百行征信) in 2018, with those eight pilot entities as stakeholders of the 
corporation.  BAIHANG CREDIT, https://www.baihangcredit.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/75HF-LC3P]. 
      44 Jack Ma’s Ant Defies Pressure from Beijing to Share More Customer Data, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/1651bc67-4112-
4ce5-bf7a-d4ad7039e7c7 [https://perma.cc/V3A8-ZURP]; Alibaba and Tencent 
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credit will remain essential but separate parts of the overarching 
social credit system.  
II. DATA AND REGULATION: THE TWO-LEVEL 
STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM 
Whether market credit or public credit, the social credit 
system itself is a two-level structure aimed at solving problems of 
information asymmetry and uncertainty.  The first level includes 
collection, analysis of credit data, and the result of that analysis, 
which is credit evaluation; the second level is a classified regulatory 
process based on the credit evaluation, including rewards for good 
credit and punishment for bad credit.45  These two levels are the two 
focal points of the current social credit engineering.  The first step is  
maintaining good records and sharing of credit data among different 
levels of authorities and agencies at the same level; the second step is 
increasing the rewards and punishments based on credit records.46 
As mentioned earlier, the first level should be extended one 
step backward and one step forward.  The step backward would 
construct better infrastructure of the social credit system, which 
provides technical support for the collection and sharing of credit data, 
though this step has its own regulatory implications.  The step 
forward would change and repair credit evaluation to social credit 
grades or ratings.  These two steps can be embedded in the structure 
of the first level, but they also have a degree of independence, so it is 
better to address them separately. 
 
 
Refuse to Hand Loans Data to Beijing, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/93451b98-da12-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17 
[https://perma.cc/U5LJ-W6Y2]. 
 45 Martin Chorzempa et al., China’s Social Credit System: A Mark of 
Progress or a Threat to Privacy?, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. 2 (2018). 
      46 Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Guihua Gangyao (2014–2020), supra note 1, 
at §§ parts IV, V.  
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Graph 1: Two-Level Structure of Social Credit System 
1. Unified Social Credit Platform and Credit Code 
Social credit evaluation is a process based on data 
accumulation, so the key component is maintaining credit records, 
which can later be accessed by public entities and used as a basis or 
reference for their decision-making. The scope of and quality of the 
data determines the outcome of the process. Therefore, the 
engineering of the social credit system requires, first of all, a data 
platform that collects, aggregates, and shares credit data.47   As a 
matter of fact, the concept of public credit as a form of social credit 
has existed for a long time, but due to administrative barriers, no 
effective data collection and sharing mechanisms were established 
among agencies at the national level, between central and local 
governments, or between the public and private sectors.48  Without 
an effective sharing mechanism, feudalism of data and information 
islands have formed among different departments, regions, and 
 
        47 Chen Xinnian(陈新年), Woguo Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Mianlin de 
Wentitiaozhan ji Duice (我国社会信用体系建设面临的问题挑战及对策) 
[Challenges Faced by China’s Social Credit System and Countermeasures], 
CHINA CREDIT, June, 2017, at 102.   
        48 Xiong Zhidong(熊治东), Gaige Kaifang yilai Zhongguo Shehui Xinyong 
Tixi Jianshe: Chengjiu, Jingyan, Wenti yu Zhanwan (改革开放以来中国社会信
用体系建设：成就、经验、问题与展望) [On the Achievements, Experience, 
Problems and Prospect of China’s Social Credit System Construction since the 
Reform and Opening-up], 261(10) CREDIT REFERENCE 12, 12–20 (2020). 
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sectors.49  Therefore, the objective at the infrastructure level of the 
social credit system is to remove those barriers and link the 
information islands to each other.  This does not mean that, under 
previous conditions, there was no data sharing among different actors, 
but rather that the development of IT provides more efficient and 
convenient methods to facilitate the whole process.   
Three notable developments in IT are crucial for the current 
social credit system. The first and most important is to establish a 
nationwide credit information sharing and publication platform.  
Local governments need to set up their own platforms, all of which 
are linked to the national platform. The national and all local 
governments in China have four basic databases maintained by 
different government sectors: register of legal entities, population, 
spatial geography, and macroeconomics. In addition, different 
government departments maintain their own public information 
databases within their respective sectors, such as tax payment, 
finance, company registration, traffic violations, etc. 50   The four 
platforms combined with supplemental sectoral information 
databases are used as the foundation for a unified platform, nationally 
and provincially, for the social credit system.  At present, the unified 
national social credit platform is Credit China.51  To date, the website 
has linked 44 agencies of the central government to every province.  
Each province has its own homepage for social credit on the Credit 
China website.  There is a brief introduction of every provincial, sub-
provincial, and prefecture-level city and comprehensive social credit 
index rankings of all the provincial and sub-provincial cities.  
Personal and corporate social credit information can be found on the 
website.  Local social credit data are required to be submitted to this 
platform regularly, especially information regarding licensing and 
administrative penalties.  In addition, central government agencies, 
industry associations, and local governments also maintain their own 
social credit platforms, like the sectoral social credit systems 
 
 49 Liao Yongan & Tan Man, Promoting the Construction of Social Credit 
System with Credit Legislation, in GUANGMING DAILY, Feb.19, 2018, at 3. 
         50 The construction of four basic databases was originally stipulated by 
Guidance of the National Informatization Leading Group on the Construction of 
E-government in China (国家信息化领导小组关于我国电子政务建设的指导意
见), ZHONGBANFA [2002] No.17, August 5, 2002.  
 51 CREDITCHINA, https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/ [https://perma.cc/R7JF-
F3C5]. 
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established by the People’s Bank of China and the Supreme People’s 
Court.52  Some of these platforms are storage-style, collecting and 
storing all kinds of social credit information, while others are index-
style, which do not store the information but have a retrieval function.  
Either way, the technical standards and formats of credit information 
are important.  For that purpose, the National Social Credit 
Standardization Technical Committee was established in 2016, and 
45 national technical standards were issued by the end of 2018.53  The 
National Development and Reform Commission also issued technical 
specifications for public credit information sharing.54 
Second, in order to determine and cross-reference the identity 
of social credit information, the Chinese government assigns all 
market players and individuals a unique social credit code.  The code 
is used as the basis for collecting, referring, sharing, and comparing 
the social credit information of every economic organization and 
every person. 55   Since October 1, 2015, China has reformed the 
regulations of organization registration and implemented a unified 
social credit code system.  The unified social credit code is divided 
into two categories: one is the social credit code identifying the 
natural person, which generally refers to the 18-digit citizen ID 
number (with the exception that sometimes the last digit is X, which 
means 10). 56   This format could be traced back to the second 
 
         52 THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA’S CREDIT REFERENCE SERVICE, 
https://ipcrs.pbccrc.org.cn/ [https://perma.cc/46P3-AATD]; THE PEOPLE’S 
SUPREME COURT’S CREDIT REFERENCE SERVICE, http://zxgk.court.gov.cn/ 
[https://perma.cc/E9CL-XSQ4]. 
 53 The 2018 Annual Meeting of the National Social Credit Standardization 
Technical Committee was Held in Beijing, SOHU NEWS (Nov. 24, 2018), 
http://www.sohu.com/a/277573986_777813 [https://perma.cc/2PC5-ZP2V]. 
 54 Guojia Fazhan Gaigewei Bangongting Guanyu Yinfa Shishi Gongong 
Xinyong Xinxi Biaozhun Tixi Kuangjia Deng Liuxiang Gongcheng Biaozhun de 
Tongzhi (国家发展改革委办公厅关于印发实施《公共信用信息标准体系框
架》等六项工程标准的通知) [Notice of Six Engineering Standards such as the 
Standard System Framework of Public Credit Information] (promulgated by 
Office of Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm., effective Dec. 6, 2017), 
FAGAIBANCAIJIN [2017] No. 1996 (China). 
      55 Yu-Jie Chen et al., “Rule of Trust”: The Power and Perils of China’s 
Social Credit Megaproject, 32 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 10–11 (2018). 
      56 Guanyu Quanmian Shenhua Gong’an Gaige Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de 
Kuangjia Yijian (关于全面深化公安改革若干重大问题的框架意见) 
[Framework of Major Issues on Comprehensively Deepening Public Security 
Reform]; for the main content of this document, see 
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generation of ID cards when the Citizen ID Law took effect in 2004,57 
while China began to use citizen ID cards in place of household 
registration early in 1986. The other category is the unified social 
credit code identifying legal persons and organizations, which is 
equivalent to an ID of the organization. The format of the 
organization social credit code is also 18 digits, a combination of 
numbers and letters.58  The organization will receive a unified social 
credit code when registering, while natural persons will receive their 
personal identification number after birth registration.  Unlike the 
social security number in the United States, which is used for more 
narrow and private purposes, the Chinese ID is a universal certificate, 
which can be used for legal domestic travel and registration 
documents. 
Third, the real-name registration, although it is not an integral 
part of the social credit system, could be used to expand the basis and 
scope of social credit data.  The wider the application of the real-name 
registration, the more easily personal trajectories in economic and 
social activities can be monitored and collected.  Of course, with 
more surveillance cameras, facial recognition technology, and the 
national population database linked to real-name registration, 
individuals have become transparent in face of public authorities.  For 
the sake of the social credit system, the Chinese government is further 
advancing real-name registration requirements, including for the 
Internet, postal services, telecommunications, and financial 
accounts.59  Real-name registration originated in the context of train 
tickets and financial transactions, but subsequently expanded to 
Internet, hotel, and postal services.  Combined with information 




      57 Article 3 of Identity Card Act (2004, amended 2011). 
      58 Faren he Qita Shehui Zuzhi Tongyi Shehui Xinyong Daima Bianma Guize 
(法人和其他组织统一社会信用代码编码规则) [Coding Rule of Unified 
Identifier of Social Credit for Legal Persons and Other Organizations] (GB 
32100-2015）. 
 59 Guowuyuan Bangongting Yinfa Guanyu Jiaqiang Geren Chengxin Tixi 
Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian (国务院办公厅印发《关于加强个人诚信体系建设 
的指导意见》) [The Guidance of Strengthening the Construction of Personal 
Integrity System] (promulgated by State Council, effective Dec. 30, 2016), 
GUOBANFA [2016] No. 98 (China). 
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powerful means of social control.  Its chilling effect, such as on online 
speech, has caused widespread concerns. 
2. Information and Evaluation: The Input and Output of Social 
Credit System 
The social credit system includes social credit information 
(input) and social credit evaluation (output).  The former refers to 
collection of credit data; the latter refers to the type of credit 
evaluation that can be made based on the information collected.  In 
the current practice of public credit in China, there are two models of 
the input and output of the social credit data, which represent the two 
extremes of the system.  One extreme is the maximum model, that is, 
the social credit information input covers every aspects of the credit 
subject, and the output is a comprehensive single social credit score 
or social credit grade; the other extreme is a minimum social credit 
information input, which collects only information of a certain aspect 
or field, and the output is a negative evaluation in the event of a 
serious infraction that indicates untrustworthiness, which can be 
translated into a social credit blacklist. 
As far as the social credit information input is concerned, the 
general content can be divided into three categories: the first is the 
input of traditional credit information, such as tax records, loan 
repayment, and utility bills; the second is the input of social 
information, including administrative punishment, market or industry 
entry prohibition, traffic violations, criminal records, enforcement of 
effective legal documents, family planning, academic integrity, 
voluntary service, and filial piety; the third is the input of online 
information, including interaction with other Internet users, the 
reliability of information posted online, and shopping habits.60  The 
information input itself should be related to social credit, including 
compliance with legal and agreed obligations. 
Under the maximum model, all the information in the above 
three categories will be collected.  The collected information may 
even go far beyond integrity to include all information related to 
compliance and personal virtues, eventually becoming all-inclusive.  
 
 60 Josh Chin & Gillian Wong, China’s New Tool for Social Control: A Credit 
Rating for Everything?, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 28, 2016), 
https://is.gd/ioOCaO [https://perma.cc/BPK7-8SWJ]. 
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This would allow the social credit system to become a comprehensive 
social control mechanism.  The early examples of this maximum 
model are the social credit engineering of Jiangsu Suining and 
Shandong Rongcheng. Jiangsu Suzhou, which topped all the other 
prefecture-level cities in the early of 2018, is also a maximum 
model.61  With the development of the social credit system, mutatis 
mutandis, more and more cities have adopted this model. 
As early as 2009, Suining County of Jiangsu Province passed 
the Suining County Mass Credit Information Evaluation Rules and 
made detailed provisions on the collection and classification of social 
credit information.  Each person is given an initial score of 1000 
points, which consists of 150 points of commercial service credit 
information, including bank loans, credit card use, private lending, 
etc.; 120 points of social service credit information, including tax 
payment, social insurance payment, etc.; 530 points of social 
management credit information, including counterfeit sales, family 
virtues, social order, traffic violations, etc.; 200 points of special 
social credit information, including civil litigation, administrative 
punishment, and criminal punishment. 62   Rongcheng, a template 
county-level city in Shandong, has compiled the Social Credit 
Information Collection Catalogue, which includes more than 600 
economic and social activities, including more than 150 bonus items 
and more than 570 deduction items, which will influence the points 
of social credit subjects according to their behavior.  The scope of 
credit information includes not only illegal activities, but also 
unethical and uncivilized activities.63  Moreover, according to these 
regulations, social credit information includes not only negative 
information, but also positive information that can be awarded extra 
points, such as obtaining certain honors, participating in volunteer 
 
 61 Ding Guofeng, Suzhou Builds a Citizen Credit Evaluation, GUIHUA 
SCORES (Aug. 16, 2018), 
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2018-
08/16/content_7619929.htm?node=5955 [https://perma.cc/5D37-8YXD]. 
 62 The Suining Government of Jiangsu Gives Credits to Citizens, and Those 
with High Scores Would Be Favored While Those with Low Scores Would Be 
Restricted (江苏睢宁政府给公民打分 优者受照顾低级受限制), CCTV.COM 
(Mar. 27, 2010), http://news.cntv.cn/china/20100327/101376.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/K9SZ-4JH8]. 
 63 Haijuan Zhao,“Rongcheng Model” has Become a New Model for the 
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services, donating blood, donating money, and standing up against 
injustice. 
At the other end of the spectrum is a minimum social credit 
information model.  The data collected under this model can be 
qualified by two factors: one is only the serious discredited 
information will be collected; the other is only public credit 
information in certain areas will be collected.  Between the maximum 
and minimum models, the middle zone is usually a combination of 
the two factors.  Namely, the information collected is public credit 
information; public credit information across the areas or within one 
or certain areas.  Another variable is whether the information 
collected demonstrates ordinary untrustworthiness or severe 
untrustworthiness.  Accumulated ordinary untrustworthiness may 
become severe untrustworthiness.  The current practice of most local 
governments in China is somewhere in between, while the agencies 
responsible for specific industries only collect credit data within their 
respective industries.  The stipulation of Shanghai is a leading 
example.  According to Shanghai Municipal Social Credit Regulation, 
the social credit catalogue of untrustworthiness information includes 
the following items: (1) failure of payment of taxes, social insurance 
premiums, administrative fees, and government funds that are due; (2) 
providing false materials, concealing the real facts so as to infringe 
the order of social administration and public interests, like submitting 
false materials in the application for a license; (3) refusing to 
implement effective legal documents; (4) administrative punishments 
made according to the ordinary procedures, except for violations of 
law that are minor or proactively eliminate or mitigate the harmful 
consequences of illegal acts; (5) being prohibited by the regulatory 
authorities from entering a particular industry.64  The regulation of 
Shanghai has mitigated situations of untrustworthiness.  In addition 
to the requirement of following the principles of lawfulness, prudence, 
and necessity, it also stipulates that unless the laws and regulations 
have clear provisions, the other violations cannot be included in the 
catalogue of untrustworthiness information. 65   Nonetheless, the 
 
 64 Shanghaishi Shehui Xinyong Tiaoli (上海市社会信用条例) [Shanghai 
Municipal Social Credit Regulations] (promulgated by Shanghai People’s Cong., 
June 23, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), art. 9 (2017). 
 65 Shanghaishi Shehui Xinyong Tiaoli (上海市社会信用条例) [Shanghai 
Municipal Social Credit Regulations] (promulgated by Shanghai People’s Cong., 
June 23, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), arts. 6, 9 (2017). 
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catalogue of untrustworthiness information can become very long 
with the development of laws and regulations. 
As we can see, the output of the social credit system, namely 
credit evaluation, varies with the models of input. The output of the 
maximum social credit information model is an all-inclusive, 
comprehensive credit profiling, indicated with a specific credit score 
or credit grade.   For example, the social credit evaluations of Suining 
and Rongcheng are both divided into different grades, corresponding 
to different levels of integrity.  According to the criteria of evaluation 
in Suining, grade A is the most trustworthy level, with a score above 
970 points; grade B is the general trustworthy level, with a score 
between 850 and 969 points; grade C is the warning level for 
trustworthiness, with a score between 600-849 points; grade D is the 
untrustworthy level, with a score below 599 points.66  Rongcheng 
further divides grade A into three levels of AAA, AA and A 
according to the points, creating six grades altogether.  Both cities 
have adopted a 1000-point score as the benchmark for personal credit 
evaluation, and the lowest level of untrustworthiness, grade D, will 
be blacklisted.67  The blacklist can be the result of an accumulation 
of social discredit data—such as the points below the social credit 
threshold, and aggregated ordinary untrustworthiness that has 
reached a degree equal to severe untrustworthiness—or it can be the 
direct result of one single incident of severe untrustworthy behavior.  
On the opposite end as the blacklist is the red list, which includes 
individuals and entities that have received high social credit points or 
special honors.  In contrast, the minimum credit data model mainly 
records serious untrustworthiness and ordinary untrustworthiness in 
 
 66 Suiningxian Dazhong Xinyong Guanli Banfa (睢宁县大众信用管理办法) 
[Suining County Public Credit Management Rule] (promulgated by Suiningxian 
Council, effective Jan. 10, 2010); Suiningxian Dazhong Xinyong Xinxi Pinggu 
Xize (睢宁县大众信用信息评估细则) [Suining County Public Credit 
Information Evaluation Rule] (promulgated by Suiningxian Council, effective 
Jan. 10,  2010); see also The Suining Government of Jiangsu Gives Credits to 
Citizens, and Those with High Scores Would Be Favored While Those with Low 
Scores Would Be Restricted, supra note 62. 
 67 Rongchengshi Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Yinfa Rongchengshi Ziranren 
Zhengxin Guanli Banfa Deng Sige Zhengxin Guanli Guidingxing Wenjian de 
Tongzhi (荣成市人民政府关于印发荣成市自然人征信管理办法等四个征信管
理规范性文件的通知) [Regulation on the Evaluation of Credit Information of 
Natural Persons and Social Legal Persons of Rongcheng City] (promulgated by 
Rongcheng City Council, effective Jan. 5, 2016), RONGZHENGFA [2016]1, art. 3 
(China). 
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specific areas, and the credit evaluation is a negative blacklist.68  This 
model usually only records severe untrustworthy behaviors in certain 
areas, such as the list of “discredited debtors” maintained by the 
judiciary and the blacklists published by the regulatory agencies 
within their respective jurisdictions.  The intermediate model does 
not have a comprehensive single rating.  Rather, it excludes market 
credit information, combines untrustworthiness across different areas, 
and the output is a blacklist and a red list.  In terms of the three models, 
the second one is most commonly found in the practice of a social 
credit system.  The first model, although more familiar because it 
draws inspiration and is based on a scoring system similar to market 
credit, is quite different from the latter.  The market credit is still a 
single-dimension evaluation of economic ability, while the former 
attempts to incorporate all dimensions into a comprehensive 
evaluation framework. 
Though more and more local governments are experimenting 
with scoring and grading every citizen and organization, including 
public officials, it is still not the universal practice across China.  
While it is true that every organization and citizen is assigned a 
unique social credit code, it is not true that every one of them receives 
a single social credit score or grade.  It is also true that, with regard 
to market credit, every organization and citizen can be and indeed is 
evaluated according to their economic ability and graded and rated, 
but it is not true that this is what is happening when it comes to public 
credit.  When talking about the social credit system in China, it is 
important not to confuse market credit with public credit, and not to 
equate what is happening in a few local jurisdictions with universal 
practice across the country.  It is possible that the maximum model 
will expand to more jurisdictions, but the more comprehensive the 
model is, the more controversial it would be. 
3. Publicity and Repair of Social Credit 
The evaluation of social credit is dynamic, and the 
accumulation of social credit is also a long-term process.  Similar to 
 
      68 See, e.g., Jiangshusheng Jidongche Jiashiren Wenming Jiaotong Xinyong 
Guanli Banfa Shixing (江苏省机动车驾驶人文明交通信用管理办法(试行)) 
[Jiangsu Province Automobile Drivers Road Civility Credit Regulations 
(Tentative)] (2015). 
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market credit, the system of public credit includes not only the 
provisions of publicity and reference of their own credit of the 
subjects, but also dissent and repair provisions.  The most important 
thing in this respect is that untrustworthy information will not affect 
the subject for life, and that there is a valid term for the publication 
of credit information. 
Under the OCSCS, the Chinese central government requires 
that all types of public credit information be displayed for a period of 
time, and public credit information that exceeds the time limit will 
not be displayed and calculated.  The working of this system is quite 
different from the market credit system, where information collection 
requires the consent of the credit subject and is only displayed 
publicly for special references.  As far as public credit information is 
concerned, it is required to be disclosed in accordance with the 
Government Information Disclosure Regulation.  At the moment, all 
the information about administrative licenses and administrative 
penalties is required to be published on the website of Credit China 
and is open for public reference.  By December 2018, Credit China 
had published more than 140 million entries of credit information 
about administrative licenses and administrative penalties, of which 
administrative license information reached 104.38 million and 
administrative penalty information reached 35.88 million. 69   As 
expected, these numbers will grow exponentially over time.  In 
addition, social credit information in key areas, mainly the blacklist 
entry, is also published on the website, such as environmental 
protection, food safety, finance, energy, government procurement, 
poverty alleviation, and public resource transactions.70  The national 
and local regulatory agencies of industry and commerce also maintain 
a separate enterprise credit information publicity system.  The 
website publishes social credit information of enterprises and 
enterprises must report the required information to agencies 
 
 69 National Development and Reform Commission, The National Credit 
Information Sharing Platform Has Accumulated 30 Billion Pieces of Various 
Credit Information, Dec. 14, 2018, http://m.house.china.com.cn/view/1548027 
[https://perma.cc/37X5-YF34]. 
 70 CREDITCHINA, supra note 51. 
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according to the regulation. 71   This system is supposed to be a 
subsystem of the comprehensive social credit system.  
In terms of who can retrieve social credit information, except 
for the information made available to the general public, the credit 
subject has the right to inquire about his or her social credit.  
Administrative agencies and the judiciary may inquire about social 
credit to fulfill their legal tasks.  The non-public social credit 
information of the subject shall not be sought or provided without the 
written content of the subject.72  As to the time limit for requesting 
social credit information, it varies across the country.  The time limit, 
for instance, is five years in Shanghai.  If the requested information 
dates back more than five years, it will not be provided.73  As for the 
period of publicity for social credit information and the blacklist, in 
Jiangsu province it is seven years for legal persons and five years for 
natural persons.74  This means that unless there are special provisions, 
the publicity continues even if the reasons have been eliminated, such 
as voluntary fulfillment of the obligation imposed by the 
administrative penalties.  A related question is, even after the inquiry 
and publicity periods, the public credit information is not eliminated 
but only transferred to the backup database.  What role this kind of 
social credit information will play in the government’s regulatory 
process, whether the public authorities can refer to such information 
and to what extent it could be properly taken into consideration, still 
needs further clarification. 
With regard to how to repair social credit, especially public 
credit, those regulations related to public credit also draw on market 
credit, set up a dissent mechanism, and stipulate ways of reducing 
loss of credit through ex post facto fulfillment of legal obligations, 
application for extension, self-interpretation, and fulfillment of the 
 
 71 Qiye Xinxi Gongshi Zanxing Tiaoli (企业信息公示暂行条例) 
[Temporary Regulation on Enterprise Information Disclosure] (promulgated by 
St. Council, Aug. 7, 2014, effective Oct. 1, 2014), [654] GUOFA (2014). 
 72 Shanghaishi Shehui Xinyong Tiaoli (上海市社会信用条例) [Shanghai 
Municipal Social Credit Regulations] (promulgated by Shanghai People’s Cong., 
June 23, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), art. 17 (2017). 
 73 Shanghaishi Shehui Xinyong Tiaoli (上海市社会信用条例) [Shanghai 
Municipal Social Credit Regulations] (promulgated by Shanghai People’s Cong., 
June 23, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), art. 35 (2017). 
 74 Jiangsusheng Yanzhong Shixin Heimingdan Shehui Gongshi Guanli Banfa 
(Shixing)(江苏省严重失信黑名单社会公示管理办法)[Jiangsu Province 
Serious Discredited Blacklist Social Publicity Management Measures 
(Tentative)], art. 9 (2015). 
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contract.  Additionally, volunteer service and charity donations help 
to repair social credit.75  Because of the dynamics of term limits and 
repairs, there is an exit mechanism for the blacklist and red list.  It 
should be added that the purpose of the dissent mechanism is to 
determine whether the social credit information is accurate.  When it 
comes to whether the blacklisting is legal or justified, the subject 
should follow the ordinary procedures of administrative 
reconsideration and administrative litigation. 
4. Legal Implications of Social Credit Evaluation: Classified 
Regulation 
At the core of legal implications of social credit evaluation is 
a concept of classified regulation.  It works similarly to the 
classification of restaurants according to the results of sanitary 
inspections.  Because social credit evaluations may vary from the 
maximum model to the minimum model, the results will affect many 
aspects of life, ranging from hotels, travel, insurance costs, 
government employment, and access to public utilities.76  In the field 
of regulatory law, subjects of different credit grades will be treated 
differently.  In this regard, social credit evaluation functions as a 
background investigation, which is similar to market credit.  The legal 
implications accordingly are different for different grades.  The 
general inclination is to reward the trustworthy and limit the 
untrustworthy across the board. 
For subjects with high grades of social credit, the legal 
implications are mainly positive incentives, for example, the 
enjoyment of red list treatment.  This kind of treatment includes a 
bonus based on reputation, and recognition and publicity as 
trustworthy enterprises, organizations, and individuals on the 
government credit website.  The red list can use the green channel for 
administrative approval, and enjoy the so-called “tolerant acceptance” 
of application materials.  This means that when major materials of an 
application are complete and basic conditions for the application are 
met while secondary materials are missing, the application would be 
accepted, while it otherwise would not.  The regulatory agencies can 
 
 75 The Guidance of Strengthening the Construction of Personal Integrity 
System, supra note 59. 
 76 Chin & Wong, supra note 60. 
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also reduce the frequency on-site inspections for those factories, 
restaurants, and other businesses on the red list and offer them priority 
access to government services by reducing the waiting time.  
Individuals on the red list can enjoy conveniences and services in the 
areas of loans, rent, travel, and tourism. 
On the opposite end, for those subjects with lower grades of 
social credit, there are four categories of restrictions and punishments 
in response to untrustworthiness: 77 the first type is market-based 
constraints and punishments, that is, the publicity of 
untrustworthiness makes discredited organizations and individuals 
restricted in market transactions.  Of course, public agencies usually 
cannot directly intervene with market activities of private 
transactions. But the authorities responsible for the social credit 
system often sign agreements with business entities to incorporate 
public credit information into their business activities, especially in 
the field of e-commerce.78  The second type is industry constraints 
and punishments: for those untrustworthy entities that violate 
autonomous rules in a specific industry, disciplinary measures such 
as warnings, intra-industry communications and criticisms, and 
public condemnation would be imposed.  The third type is social 
constraints and punishments, such as through disclosure and exposure 
of untrustworthy behaviors, through remarks, commentaries, critical 
reports of the public, etc., and through social moral condemnation, 
thus deterring untrustworthy behavior.  The fourth type is 
government regulatory constraints and punishments.  The two 
 
 77 Guowuyuan Guanyu Jianli Wanshan Shouxin Lianhe Jili he Shixin Lianhe 
Chengjie Zhidu Jiakuai Tuijin Shehui Chengxin Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian (国务
院关于建立完善守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒制度加快推进社会诚信建设
的指导意见)[The State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Establishing and 
Improving the Joint Incentives for Trustworthiness and the Joint Punishment for 
Untrustworthiness and Accelerating the Construction of Social Integrity] 
(promulgated by St. Council, May 30, 2016, effective June 12, 2016), GUOFA 
[2016] No. 33. 
     78 For example, The National Public Credit Information Center reached 
agreement with Pinshang E-Commerce for sharing credit information in May, 
2018, 
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/xinyongdongtai/buwei/201805/t20180530_11694
6.html [https://perma.cc/67SU-R87P]; the National Public Credit Information 
Center also signed credit information sharing agreements with 15 credit service 
agencies in May, 2017, https://www.sohu.com/a/138493800_589061 
[https://perma.cc/P3EP-3UNY]. 
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examples of these measures are blacklisting and joint punishments.  
Both are the top priorities of the current social credit engineering. 
The legal implications of the blacklist in the regulatory 
process come in different forms.  It may have direct legal effects, or 
may influence the reputation of the subjects indirectly through mere 
publication, or may be just a factor for the regulatory authorities to 
consider.  However, these three legal implications often work 
together in a single regulatory practice.  First, publication of the 
blacklist can exert the effects of market and social constraints and 
punishments.  For the moment, the list of “discredited debtors” in the 
area of fulfilling judicial decisions and the list of those deemed as 
“severely untrustworthy” in the field of public administration are 
publicly released on websites. 79   The disclosure itself has a 
shame/blame effect, though the effectiveness may vary among 
contexts.  Let me further explain this with one typical example.  The 
blacklist of the court is to condemn parties who have the ability and 
means to fulfill their obligations, but avoid doing or refuse to do so. 
By the end of November 2018, the courts across China had 
blacklisted a total of 12.58 million people who had lost their credits, 
accumulatively restricted the purchase of 16.44 million airline tickets, 
restricted the purchase of 5.38 million high-speed train tickets, and 
3.39 million discredited debtors voluntarily fulfilled their 
obligations.80   Various levels of courts across China have almost 
exhausted all means of bringing the pressure of public opinion to bear 
on the “discredited debtors,” such as rolling out the names on large 
screens in downtown areas, and publishing names on TV and bus 
boards.  Some courts even customize answering machines on the 
discredited debtor’s mobile phones: “The user you dialed has been 
identified by the court as a discredited debtor;” and within 20 
kilometers of the discredited debtor’s place of residence, the 
information about their untrustworthiness will be posted to all phone 
users by messaging.81 
 
 79 The former could be accessed through http://shixin.court.gov.cn/index.html 
[https://perma.ccZJ5X-NZWK]; the latter could be accessed through 
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/xinyongfuwu/shixinheimingdan/ 
[https://perma.cc/7K3M-DMC7]. 
 80 Development and Reform Commission, supra note 69. 
 81 Nin Boda de Jizhu Shi Laolai, Zhe Neng Pojie Zhixing Nan? Biedoule (您
拨打的机主是老赖，这能破解执行难? 别逗了) [The User You Called is Lao 
Lai, Can This Crack the Difficulties of Enforcement? Don’t be Kidding], JIANSHU 
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Second, the blacklist can function as a discretionary factor in 
government regulation, which is equivalent to background 
investigation measures.  For this purpose, there are also blacklists that 
are not made public, but are maintained by authorities themselves and 
are not necessarily shared with other authorities or persons concerned.  
Under the social credit system, through information sharing platforms, 
the role of blacklisting extends beyond the authorities and industries 
that established the blacklist in the first place.  For example, in the 
process of administrative licensing, those on the blacklist will be 
under stricter review, and the summary procedure does not apply in 
their cases.  In the process of enforcement, the socially discredited 
will be subject to more frequent investigations and strengthened on-
site inspections.  Here, the function of the blacklist is the same as the 
watch list.  For example, there is a watch list in the field of foreign 
currency exchange management.  The period of watch is two years 
from the time a person first appears on the watch list.  During the 
watch period, when people on the list engage in foreign currency 
exchange, the bank is supposed to review the materials more strictly 
than for those not on the list; in addition to showing their valid 
identity documents, the people on the list must provide additional 
evidence relating to the transaction.82  This watch list thus plays a 
warning role in the regulatory process. 
Third, blacklisting can also have direct legal effects, and in 
this case, it is an integral and dependent part of a specific regulatory 
measure.  What is legally binding is the regulatory measure, such as 
market entry restrictions, airplane and train restrictions, and bids for 
public procurement restrictions—not the blacklist itself.  For example, 
in the case of foreign currency exchange management, on top of the 
watch list is a blacklist, and people on the blacklist are prohibited 
from currency exchanges for two years.  In this way, we can 
distinguish the second implication of the blacklist from the third one. 
Joint punishments contrast with one-time punishments in one 
particular area.  The current social credit system intends to increase 
 
(June 14, 2017), https://www.jianshu.com/p/32f486bd0e61 
[https://perma.cc/KGJ4-MB6S]. 
 82 Zuo Zhe Sanjianshi Ni Jiangshang Heimingdan, Bei Quxiao Huanhui Zige 
(做这 3件事你将上黑名单，被取消换汇资格) [You Will be Blacklisted for 
These 3 Things and will be Disqualified for Currency Exchange], DAFENGHAO 
(Mar. 1, 2017), http://wemedia.ifeng.com/6635888/wemedia.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/TYT6-CNYY]. 
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the intensity of punishment towards untrustworthiness by responding 
to a breech in one area with broad-based restrictions.  The premise of 
joint punishments is that information of untrustworthiness could 
easily be shared with and accessed by other authorities.  Past 
information of untrustworthiness will inform future and cross-sector 
decision-making, or untrustworthiness in one industry or jurisdiction 
may lead to corresponding punishments in other industries and other 
jurisdictions.  In the event of a  joint punishment, when one agency 
initiates punishment of an untrustworthy actor, other agencies will 
subsequently impose penalties on the untrustworthy in accordance 
with legal guidelines.  In order to coordinate the joint actions, there 
have been efforts to reach joint constraints and punishments 
memoranda among different agencies and parties from the public and 
private sectors.  By the end of 2019, there were around 50 joint 
memoranda at the national level. 83   The provincial governments 
coordinate the joint punishments within their own jurisdictions 
accordingly.  With the growing scope and coverage of the joint 
memoranda, a person’s untrustworthy behavior in one place will 
affect their behavior and treatment across the country. 
There are two types of punishments according to these joint 
memorandums.  One is mandatory, and the other is discretionary.84  
The former means that the untrustworthiness will have direct legal 
effects in other fields or places, while the latter means that 
untrustworthiness will be used only as a reference for decision-
making in other fields or places.  As to the first type, according to 
those memoranda, the restrictive and punishment measures include: 
85(1) restrictions on admission to certain industries and access to 
 
       83 For the list of the joint memos, see 
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/lianhejiangcheng/lingyulianhejiangcheng/ 
[https://perma.cc/M23H-TEMJ]. 
       84 Guowuyuan guanyu Jianli Wanshan Shouxin Lianhe Jili he Shixin 
Lianhechengjie Zhidu Jiankuai Tuijin Shehui Chengxin Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian 
(国务院关于建立完善守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒制度 
加快推进社会诚信建设的指导意见) [State Council’s Guiding Principles on 
Establishing A Comprehensive Credit Incentive and Punishment System], Guofa 
[2016] No.33, § IV, para.20, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-
06/12/content_5081222.htm [https://perma.cc/N4JY-NLSN]. 
       85 Guanyu Jiakuai Tuijin Shixin Beizhixingren Xinyong Jiandu Jingshi he 
Chengjie Jizhi Jianshe de Yijian (关于加快推进失信被执行人信用监督、警示
和惩戒机制建设的意见) [Opinions on Accelerating the Mechanisms of Credit 
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government support, including restrictions on the allocation of scarce 
public resources, like the chance of obtaining a car license plate; (2) 
restrictions on high-expenditure items, including a ban on taking 
flights, high-speed trains, staying at luxury hotels, and restricting the 
children of the person in question from attending expensive private 
schools; (3) restrictions on financing credits in financial securities; (4) 
restrictions on obtaining qualifications, and restrictions on 
recruitment as civil servants or staff of public institutions; (5) in terms 
of social image, restrictions on obtaining honorary titles, and 
revocation of honors having been awarded; (6) restrictions on 
political rights, such as the person responsible for untrustworthy 
production and business units will not be recommended as a 
candidate for the people’s congress, among other political roles. 
 
III. THE NEW BOTTLE OF TECHNOLOGY: ALGORITHM 
GOVERNANCE DRIVEN BY SOCIAL CREDIT DATA 
From a historical perspective, significant changes seem to 
have taken place in the two structures—technical and regulatory—of 
the social credit system.  Based on the extent of and reasons for 
change, it is obvious that the change at the technical level is more 
fundamental.  The change at the regulatory level, though significant 
as well, is mainly due to the changes at technical level.  Although 
China’s current social credit system has not reached the era of big 
data-driven algorithm governance, however, the system itself is 
evolving.  The Chinese government has a much bigger ambition to 
“promote the integration of blockchain technology and artificial 
intelligence and establish a new social credit system.”86  At the local 
level, there have been pilot programs in the direction of big data and 
algorithm governance. 87 This part of the paper will analyze grave 
 
Supervision, Warning, and Punishment for Untrustworthy Persons], 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-09/25/content_5111921.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XU93-U8XL]. 
 86 Guowuyuan Guanyu Yinfa Xinyidai Rengong Zhineng Fazhan Guihua de 
Tongzhi (国务院关于印发新一代人工智能发展规划的通知)[Notice of the 
State Council on Printing and Distributing a New Generation of Artificial 
Intelligence Development Plan], Guofa [2017] No. 35, promulgated by St. Council, 
July 8, 2017, effective July 20, 2017, §§ 3.3.4. 
      87 The first two provinces are Henan and Guizhou: see Henan Implemented A 
Pilot Program of National Social Credit System and Big Data Development, 
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problems that arise from data input and evaluation output, especially 
in the maximum model. 
1. Social Credit Profiling: The Data Foundation of the Social Credit 
System 
With the rapid development of modern information 
technology, it is quite possible that social credit engineering will 
establish a social credit profile of all market and social subjects. 
Under the aforementioned maximum model of social credit 
information, the content of the social credit profile may be all-
encompassing if market credit information and public credit 
information are combined.  For example, the contents of 
Rongcheng’s social credit files include: basic information, 
administrative regulation, business management, bank loans, industry 
evaluation, media evaluation, market feedback, and more.  It may 
even include information on family morals and social virtues, such as 
uncivilized behavior in tourism, filial piety, domestic violence, and 
neighborhood disputes. 88  The regulations in Shanghai even stipulate 
children’s obligation to visit their parents regularly.89  If children fail 
to fulfill this obligation, the information will be collected and 
 
HENAN DAILY (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-
12/08/content_5245207.htm [https://perma.cc/GRT5-YFFH] 
 88 Rongchengshi Renmin Zhengfu Guanyu Yinfa Rongchengshi Ziranren 
Zhengxin Guanli Banfa Deng Sige Zhengxin Guanli Guidingxing Wenjian de 
Tongzhi (荣成市人民政府关于印发荣成市自然人征信管理办法等四个征信管
理规范性文件的通知) [Regulation on the Evaluation of Credit Information of 
Natural Persons and Social Legal Persons of Rongcheng City] (promulgated by 
Rongcheng City Council, effective Jan. 5, 2016), RONGZHENGFA [2016]1, art. 3 
(China). 
 89 Shanghai Regulation on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the 
Elderly(上海市老年人权益保障条例), art. 14 (2016).  This article is from 
Elderly Rights Protection Act (2012); Ningning Zhu, Let’s Go Home and Visit the 
Elder Parents Has Been Accused of Not Being Used for Many Years, CHINA 
NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2017/01-17/8126260.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/ZAH2-TMEL]. 
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classified as discredit.90  This kind of regulation has become very 
controversial since social credit has become all-inclusive.91 
Therefore, the first and most important challenge with social 
credit profiling is determining what information is relevant to social 
credit.  The result of unlimited expansion of social credit information 
under the maximum model will lead to emergence of a 
comprehensive digital profile, instead of a social credit profile.  In 
that case, the name of the system will deviate from reality.  First, the 
information collected in the social credit profile should be related to 
integrity of the subjects, and not all violations are related to deception 
and dishonesty.  Because integrity as it pertains to social credit 
involves the subjective moral awareness of being honest and keeping 
promises, for the purpose of fulfillment of court decisions, those who 
are financially capable but refuse to fulfill the obligations are quite 
different from those financially incapable of fulfilling the obligations.  
It is a pity that the Supreme Court does not distinguish between these 
circumstances, but instead labels both parties as discredited debtors. 
It is also inappropriate to include traffic violations in social credit 
input for the same reason.  This is not to say that obeying laws, 
including traffic regulations, is not highly valued in society.  It only 
means that the social credit system should be consistent with its goals 
and not deviate from the specific problems it aims to solve. 
Second, social credit data in different fields measure different 
aspects of a subject’s character and should not be mixed all together.  
This is also the problem with the algorithm of social credit.  It has 
been pointed out that China’s current centralized credit evaluation is 
not as good as the market-oriented decentralized credit evaluation.92  
 
      90 Waimei Guanzhu Shanghai Xiaoshun Xingui: Bu Tanwang Laoren jiang jin 
Xinyong Heimingdan (外媒关注上海“孝顺新规”:不探望老人将进信用黑名单) 
[Foreign Press Pays Attention to Shanghai’s New Regulation That Blacklists 
People Who Don’t Visit Their Parents], http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-
04/13/c_128890830.htm [https://perma.cc/8HBG-DEF3]. 
     91 Wang Yubin (王珏玢) & Pan Ye (潘晔), Mei Changhuijia Kankan, ye suan 
Shixin? Xinyong Chengjie Fanhua (没常回家看看，也算失信？信用惩戒泛化) 
[Failiing to Come Home is a Breach of Social Credit? Abuse of Credit 
Punishments], HUANGSHENG 9 (2020) . 
 92 Abigail Deveraux & Linan Peng, Give Us a Little Social Credit: To Design 
or to Discover Personal Ratings in the Era of Big Data, CAMBRIDGE J. 
INSTITUIONAL ECON., at 381-382 (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-institutional-
economics/article/give-us-a-little-social-credit-to-design-or-to-discover-personal-
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It is true that the latter is richer and more diversified in data, able to 
reflect more aspects of the subject, and aligns personal profiling more 
effectively and accurately with the goals of credit data collected.93  
Market credit and public credit play different roles and weigh 
different things. Suppose a person whose traffic violations 
accumulate up to six times, the social credit rating of him would be 
graded as C or blacklisted, and then the subject would be limited in 
many areas, such as application for subsistence allowances and low-
interest loan applications.  Even if credit of traffic violations is 
deemed relevant to economic status and privileges, it is difficult to 
determine to what extent it is relevant and what weight it should be 
given. 
Third, data input may be inadequate or incomplete related to 
under the maximum model.  The maximum model outputs a 
comprehensive score, which determines the treatment the subject 
receives with respect to public services and public administration, so 
the data collected for each subject should be consistent and 
comparable for each variable. However, even with modern IT 
technology, it is difficult to make it a nationwide project to obtain and 
track all activity information of each person.  Those with less data 
might be unevenly influenced by the evaluation and consequently 
unduly restricted from access to government services.  However, data 
are currently in the hands of different sectors: e.g., public credit data 
are scattered across the agencies, while social media and online 
purchasing data are in the hands of private companies.  Although the 
social credit system has the ambition of integrating the public and 
market credit data, and some joint memoranda exist, since data is gold 
in the digital economy era, private companies such as Alibaba, 
Tencent, and Didi, have no real incentive to share data with the 
government.94 
In contrast, the public credit and the minimum model seem 
more promising.  The public credit data are collected by public 
authorities and the output is mainly a negative blacklist, which leads 
to only restrictions and punishments intra-and across-industries 




       93 Id. 
       94 See generally supra note 44.  
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of the subjects.  In general, the more data social credit attempts to 
include, the more problems it might create; the more the system is 
limited to a particular aspect, the higher the accuracy it would have. 
2. Algorithmic Problems of Social Credit Output 
If social credit evaluation is based on big data, then it may be 
handed over to algorithms to make decisions.95  In the field of social 
credit evaluation, algorithms function as a decision-making process, 
not a value-free calculation.  At present, in the social credit 
engineering programs of some cities and the evaluation of market 
credit of some private companies, algorithms on the basis of artificial 
intelligence and big data have become increasingly common.  
Algorithm-based governance has all the problems that have been 
addressed frequently, such as opacity and discrimination.96  A data-
based automated decision-making apparatus will create serious 
problems for due process as well.97 
Problems of the algorithm-driven decision-making take on 
different forms under the social credit system.  First, under the 
maximum model, data of various aspects have different goals, and 
they are in their nature incommensurable.  As mentioned earlier, with 
regard to public credit, it is hard to measure traffic violations—not to 
mention failing to regularly visit aged parents—against the ability to 
repay a loan on time.  The same problem impedes the repair of social 
credit.  It is hard to tell how the loss of social credit scores in certain 
aspects can be repaired through blood donation and money donation.  
As to market credit, many credit investigations rely on the Internet 
and big data, but there is transaction information, as well as behavior 
information and social information, which is different in nature.  The 
aforementioned single comprehensive grade may mask the 
incommensurability of these different variables.  It is morally 
arbitrary to assign 30 points to one traffic violation and 40 points to 
not visiting aged parents regularly.  Of course, the opacity problem 
of algorithms can be alleviated by disclosing the calculation method 
 
 95 Nizan Geslevich-Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the 
Right to be Unnetworked, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 401–408 (2016). 
 96 Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond 
Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLORIDA L. REV. 181, 189–190 
(2017). 
 97 Chen et al., supra note 18, at 32. 
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for public credit, but this does not explain the reasons why different 
behaviors are assigned certain points.  Compared with market credit, 
public credit can be trusted to the legislature to decide, which will use 
the political process to justify any such provisions. 
The second problem regards the discrimination inherent in the 
algorithm.98  The data on which the algorithm depends is not neutral.  
For example, in the social credit survey of the eight entities 
authorized by the People’s Bank of China, the social elite’s credit 
score is relatively high, and the credit score of the economically 
underprivileged is relatively low, which is also the case in market 
credit score.99  Algorithms can also discriminate on the basis of race, 
religion, and even gender.  At present, the social credit evaluation 
based on network data does not include enough data information.  So 
it is hard to give the subject a complete and comprehensive evaluation. 
Another example is the evolution of social credit through donations, 
which will result in obvious discrimination between those keen to get 
a higher score through donations and those who are not economically 
or physically capable of doing so.100  Not to mention, how does the 
method of evaluation affect the farm worker and people living in rural 
areas?  In turn, the more data collected, the more aspects included in 
social credit, the more the algorithm requires explanation. 
Therefore, under the maximum model of social credit 
information, to ensure the fairness and accuracy of the social credit 
evaluation, in addition to collecting as much data as possible to ensure 
the completeness of the profiling, it is also necessary to specify the 
aspects evaluated.  In contrast, the algorithm for the minimum model 
must only explain how blacklists are generated.  This is usually a 
 
 98 Bryce Goodman, & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on 
Algorithmic Decision-Making and A “Right to Explanation”, in ICML 
WORKSHOP ON HUMAN INTERPRETABILITY IN MACHINE LEARNING, Aug. 31, 
2016, 3–5. 
 99 Nittle, supra note 40. 
      100 For example, the regulation of Rongcheng provides that money donation is 
a positive item. Rongcheng Natural Person Credit Reference Rule [荣成市自然人
征信管理办法] (2016); the national policy that blood donation would be 
introduce into social credit system became a hot topic in 2019, for this, see 
Xiongzhi, Wuchang Xianxue ye ru Zhengxin bie ba Zhengxin Dangcheng 
Wanneng de Kuang (无偿献血也入征信，别把征信当成万能的筐) [Counting 
Blood Donation as a Form of Social Credit, Social Credit is not the Solution for 
All], GUANGMING REVIEW (Nov. 20, 2019), https://news.gmw.cn/2019-
11/20/content_33336333.htm [https://perma.cc/763B-RVFC] 
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decision-making process based on administrative procedures.  
Compared to the big data driven maximum model, the minimum 
model is more transparent and easier to interpret.  In practice, what 
kinds of untrustworthy information are included in public credit are 
prescribed by local regulations, and also to what extent the 
accumulated ordinary untrustworthiness would be considered as 
severe untrustworthiness.  This is not to say the local legislative 
process is perfect, but it is still relatively open and accountable.  At 
the same time, under the minimum model, the standard of blacklist is 
rather certain, regardless of the data such as trajectories, probabilities, 
and preferences used under the maximum model.  The maximum 
model output is a clear social credit profile of the subject, while the 
result of the minimum model is a negative list. 
3. Human Dignity: Social Credit Grades or Blacklist? 
If the aforementioned problems with data and algorithms are 
overcome, big data-driven algorithms do have the potential to change 
law and governance in the future.101  However, even if it can solve 
those problems, a single comprehensive social credit score is not 
desirable.  This is because such a social credit rating, like that in 
Suining and Rongcheng, in dividing social credit status into four or 
six grades, has the potential to harm fundamental human dignity.  
This is only because a comprehensive social credit status is more like 
an evaluation of personality, which is inherently subjective and 
should be valued accordingly.  However, this is not to say that in areas 
of market credit, such as evaluating the ability of the subject to repay 
loans, or grading market entities according to their economic ability, 
is legally or morally unacceptable.  It is not the same problem as 
public credit because the former is mainly applied with respect to 
private transactions.  Under the maximum model, the evaluation of 
social credit is directly related to the treatment of credit subjects, such 
as access to public facilities, even opportunities to public services and 
political rights.  If the development of the market economy is the 
process of liberation from status to contract, then this kind of credit 
evaluation that is directly related to the privilege of public facilities 
has the potential of reconstructing a “dynamic status.”  Even though 
 
 101 Dai, supra note 17, at 52–59. 
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everyone starts on equal footing before the introduction of a grade, 
the grading itself can take a toll on human dignity. 
With the development of IT technology, supplemented by 
those requirements of real-name registration, and the more 
comprehensive collection of subjects’ trajectories and activities on 
various platforms, it seems possible to make credit evaluations on the 
basis of sufficient and even complete information in the future, so as 
to ensure that different groups can be treated fairly.  However, even 
if this is possible, it is not desirable.  This would mean that all aspects 
of an individual’s history—not only public credit but also market 
credit—would be exposed to the public authorities.  The result that 
individuals would become transparent before the state brings serious 
privacy concerns.  This is another way in which human dignity would 
be infringed. 
In sum, this paper argues that the content of social credit 
should be distinguished among different fields.  In the market 
economy, the evaluation of performance and repayment ability based 
on the economic ability of market entities, is of great value for 
ensuring the security of economic transactions, reducing transaction 
costs, and even determining the interest rate of borrowing.  However, 
in the arena of public credit, if social credit evaluation is linked to 
qualifications of the subjects, and public credit records are used as a 
reference factor for public resource allocation and regulatory 
measures, there must provide more strong justifications.In this 
regard, the positive social credit profiling, which refers to a 
comprehensive single social credit score, is not as acceptable as a 
negative blacklist, whether at the technical or regulatory level. 
IV. NEW FACES OF OLD REGULATORY WINES: LEGAL 
QUESTIONS TO BE SOLVED 
It is not uncommon for the government in China to investigate 
the background of private parties in the regulatory process, which is 
also quite common in the Western countries.102  In this sense, the 
social credit system is in essence a common regulatory apparatus.  
However, changes in relevant technologies have brought new 
 
      102 Jeremy Baum, Social Credit Overview Podcast, CHINA L. TRANSLATE 
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/social-credit-overview-
podcast/?lang=en [https://perma.cc/7FMD-526C]; 
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concerns to the old process of regulation.  The first is, compared with 
the past, technology-based information sharing and joint punishment 
attempt to pursue the goal of regulation by increasing the intensity of 
punishment.  This begs the question of the normative foundation of 
such measures. 103   The second question is, according to the 
memoranda of joint punishments, there is an important tendency 
toward automated decision-making using modern IT technology.  
However, given that blacklisting and joint punishment would 
seriously influence the interests of the subjects, how to protect their 
interests and rights under the new conditions is a question that must 
be addressed.104  The third question asks how successful will a social 
credit system be in solving the lack of integrity by increasing the 
intensity of punishment.  I think this gets to the very heart of the effort 
of the social credit engineering.105 
1. The Normative Basis of Blacklisting and Punishments 
The normative basis of social credit punishment includes both 
formal and substantive foundations.  With respect to the formal 
requirement, the premise of joint punishment is that information can 
be effectively shared—and that punishment, whether joint or not, 
have a legal basis.  According to the principle of legality, any 
constraints and punishments should have a legal basis. 106 The main 
normative basis of current joint punishments is that they already 
existed in various legislation—or the blacklisting is used as the basis 
 
       103 See generally Shen kui (沈岿): Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe de Fazhi 
ZhiDao (社会信用体系建设的法治之道) [Rule of Law of the Social Credit 
System], 5 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE 25, 25–46 (2019).  
       104 See Yu-Jie Chen et al., “Rule of Trust”: The Power and Perils of China’s 
Social Credit Megaproject, 32 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 31–35 (2018); see generally 
Yu Qingsong (虞青松), Suanfa Xingzheng: Shehui Xinyong Tixi Zhili Fanshi jiqi 
Fazhihua (算法行政: 社会信用体系治理范式及其法治化) [Algorithmatic 
Administration: Social Credit System Governance and its Legality], 35(2) LEGAL 
FORUM 36, 36–49 (2020). 
       105 For a more optimistic view, see Dai Xin, Lijie Shehui Xinyong de 
Zhengtixin Shijiao (理解社会信用的整体性视角) [Understanding the Social 
Credit System from a Comprehensive Perspective], 6 PEKING UNIV. L. J. 1469–
1491 (2019).  
       106 For the general discussion of the requirement of legality, see 
XINGZHENGFA YU XINGZHENG SUSONGFA XUE (行政法与行政诉讼法学) (Jiang 
Ming’an ed., 7th ed., Peking Univ. Press,  2019) 69–72. 
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for discretionary considerations in decision-making—which do not 
require as strong a legal basis.  This is exactly what happens in the 
approximately 50 joint punishment memoranda, all of which 
specified the basis of joint punishment measures.  In this case, joint 
punishments do not exceed the framework of existing legislation, at 
least on the face.107   However, in terms of blacklisting and joint 
punishments, due to changes in technical conditions—that is, through 
information sharing and joint actions by various agencies—the 
impact of the social credit system as a regulatory tool on the rights 
and interests of subjects is obviously far-reaching.  It is not merely a 
combination of preexisting regulations.  Because of joint actions, the 
severity of the punishment for untrustworthy behavior is much 
heavier than before.  Sometimes the punishment will automatically 
apply without any further exercise of discretion.  At present, the main 
normative basis of China’s social credit joint punishment is found in 
the documents and guidelines of the Chinese Communist Party and 
the national government. There is no official national legislation.  
With changes to the regulatory tools, national legislation is needed to 
prescribe the scope of joint actions, applicable conditions, and 
punishment, and the degree of social harm should meet the 
requirements of the principle of proportionality.108 
At the same time, the nationalization of local blacklists and 
punishments requires national legislation as well.  According to the 
provisions of the “Legislation Law,” 109  localities have stipulated 
blacklists and joint punishment measures within the scope of their 
own jurisdictions.  However, the reach of a blacklist’s influence can 
quickly expand to the national level.  For example, Rongcheng’s 
blacklist is required to be transferred not only to the platform of 
Weihai, the prefecture-level city with which Rongcheng is affiliated, 
but also to the platforms of Shandong and Credit China, the national 
 
     107 Most of those memos would include an appendix demonstrating the legal 
basis of the regulatory measures and joint punishments, with the implication that 
the memo is just restating existing rules. See generally the list of the memos, 
https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/lianhejiangcheng/lingyulianhejiangcheng/.    
 108 Shen, supra note 103; Hu Jianmiao (胡建淼), “Heimingdan” Buneng 
“Heishang” (“黑名单”不能“黑上”) [“Blacklisting System” Cannot Be 
Blacklisted], 1 MINGJIA ZHUANLAN RULE OF LAW COFFEE SHOP (名家专栏 法治
咖啡屋) 85, 85 (2017). 
     109 The Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 
Standing Comm., Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, 
amended Mar. 18, 2015), CLI.1.26942 (LawinfoChina). 
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social credit information platform. This does not mean the 
blacklisting of Rongcheng will be accepted by the other authorities 
across China automatically.  But logically those what happens in 
Roncheng would be transparent to all those who have access to the 
website. Meanwhile, once the joint punishment action is initiated, 
under the conditions of modern technology, its effect will far exceed 
the local jurisdiction if and when it is recognized by other 
jurisdictions. For example, many places now recognize the list of 
discredited subjects beyond their own jurisdictions.110  The question 
that will inevitably arise here is that, if a person is blacklisted in 
Shandong, should he or she be restricted in Henan or Beijing?  This 
means that a decision made by a county government may have 
nationwide effects.  This is a question needs to be addressed by 
national legislation, from a national perspective, not by local 
governments, from the local perspective. 
In terms of the substantive normative basis of joint 
punishments, first of all, it should specify those subjects that will be 
punished.  According to the national government, it is only severe 
untrustworthiness that should be punished. 111 Therefore, those 
punished can only be the untrustworthy subject, not the relevant 
stakeholders, and collateral liabilities cannot be imposed upon those 
stakeholders.112  For example, according to regulations, restricting 
the subject of untrustworthiness to enter relevant industries or related 
fields, should only be targeted at those responsible, and should not 
expanded to the rights of other directors, supervisors, or 
stakeholders.113 
 
     110 For data sharing among provinces, a recent effort in this direction is Hunan, 
https://www.sohu.com/a/409956788_120631680 [https://perma.cc/VNV6-X72U]. 
 111 Guowuyuan Guanyu Jianli Wanshan Shouxin Lianhe Jili he Shixin Lianhe 
Chengjie Zhidu Jiakuai Tuijin Shehui Chengxin Jianshe de Zhidao Yijian (国务
院关于建立完善守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒制度加快推进社会诚信建设
的指导意见) [The State Council’s Guiding Opinions on Establishing and 
Improving the Joint Incentives for Trustworthiness and the Joint Punishment for 
Untrustworthiness and Accelerating the Construction of Social Integrity], GUOFA 
[2016] No. 33, promulgated by St. Council, May 30, 2016, effective June 12, 
2016, art. 9 (China). 
    112 Id. 
    113 The exact scope depends on circumstances. The People’s Supreme court 
makes this very clear: Where a unit is listed as untrustworthy, the people's court 
shall not include its legal representative, principal responsible person, directly 
responsible person affecting the performance of the debt, or actual controller, etc. 
on the untrustworthiness list.  The People’s Supreme Court, Guanyu zai Zhixing 
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Second, the content of joint punishment should be 
intrinsically relevant to the untrustworthy behaviors. 114  In other 
words, the subject can only be jointly punished in fields closely 
related to the field in which he or she is not performing well.  For 
example, for violations related to market regulation, such as 
commercial fraud, counterfeiting, and swindling, agencies of market 
regulation, price and urban management, and other enforcement 
agencies can share the information and implement joint punishment.  
However, if the person involved is restricted with respect to personal 
consumption, there should be no relevance. Similarly, the 
justification for restricting the political rights of social credit subjects 
must consider both its normative implications and substantive 
relevance.115 
2. Due Process and Social Credit Punishment 
As mentioned above, within social credit information sharing 
and joint punishment systems, there is now a trend towards 
technological automation.  In practice, the joint punishment agencies 
are connected with the national credit information sharing platform: 
through the network they automatically capture the blacklist, and the 
joint punishment will be embedded in the agency’s management, 
approval, and work proceedings, with the purpose of automatic 
comparison, automatic interception, automatic supervision and 
automatic punishment of those on the blacklist.116  Of course, this is 
the convenience carried by developments in technology.  However, 
 
Gongzuo Zhong jinyibu Qianghua Shanyi Wenming Zhixing Linian de Yijian(关
于在执行中进一步强化善意文明执行理念的意见), SOHU NEWS (Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://www.sohu.com/a/365151076_813375 [https://perma.cc/4DRL-GGT9].  
    114 Shen, supra note 103, at 39. 
    115 According to the Legislation Law, the deprivation of political rights should 
be prescribed by law passed by the national People’s Congress (Vorbehalt des 
Gesetzes).  The Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China 
(promulgated by Standing Comm., Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 15, 2000, effective 
July 1, 2000, amended Mar. 18, 2015), CLI.1.26942 art. 9 (LawinfoChina).   
 116 Article 39 of Management of Credit Reference of Natural Persons in 
Rongcheng City provides that the credit evaluation grades required for party and 
government management in our city are extracted from the public credit 
information database by computer.  The evaluation results are automatically 
formed according to the relevant credit rating system and updated with the update 
of the credit information database. 
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blacklisting and joint punishment involve the personal interests of 
social credit subjects.  In particular, the fully automated evaluation of 
personality should be prohibited, and the requirements for human 
intervention should be retained whenever there are such requests.117 
What’s more, when blacklists are generated and joint 
punishments implemented, social credit subjects lack adequate due 
process protection and should be provided with minimum procedural 
protection through legislation.  For instance, social credit subjects 
should have access to a hearing.  At present, while the blacklist is still 
nascent and its role evolving, subjects have not been given sufficient 
opportunity to be informed and heard in practice.  Even if a subject 
disputes a discredit, the agency will continue to publicize his or her 
untrustworthiness, or even automatically initiate the process of joint 
punishment.  The mere appearance of a name on the blacklist will 
greatly influence the subject’s reputation and affect his or her other 
interests greatly as well.  Given the weight of the blacklist, any 
subject should be able to contest evaluations and express opinions.  
As far as the interests of the subject are concerned, the publication of 
blacklists and joint punishment should be considered as an 
independent administrative measure, rather than as an outcome of 
previous administrative decisions.  At the same time, since joint 
punishment involves joint actions of multiple agencies, it is 
equivalent to multiple administrative decisions.  If only the first 
agency that proposes joint punishment affords the chance of a hearing 
to the subject, it is not enough to provide sufficient protection.  There 
needs to be a more comprehensive specialized hearing agency to 
conduct relevant hearings. 
A further question relates to the investigation process.  If the 
blacklist is automatically converted into joint punishment or 
restrictive measures, should other agencies of joint action need to 
retain an independent investigation procedure, or should they directly 
accept the blacklist and initiate joint punishment?  For the joint 
punishment, the initiating agency should not only provide a blacklist, 
but also clear reasons for blacklisting and for the joint punishment.  
The agencies of joint punishment should retain the power to 
 
 117 Zha Yunfei (查云飞), Rengong Zhineng Shidai Quanzidong Juti 
Xingcheng Xingwei Yanjiu (人工智能时代全自动具体行政行为研究) [Research 
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investigate the punishment as they see necessary, considering not 
only the blacklist, but also the actions that led to the initial decision 
to blacklist. 
Finally, there is a question about the dissent and litigation 
procedures.  According to the current procedures of administrative 
reconsideration and litigation, dissent and litigation does not stop the 
implementation of administrative actions.  This  blacklist will remain 
public even while complaints are pending before agencies or courts.  
Given the influence of the blacklist itself and the triggering of joint 
punishment accordingly, the effectiveness of ex post facto relief is not 
sufficient to protect the interests of the social credit subject, while the 
joint punishment can lead to irreparable damage. 
3. Social Integrity through Punishment? 
If the price of untrustworthiness is increased through 
blacklisting and joint punishment, can the social credit system 
improve the integrity of society as a whole?  Although progress has 
been made, it seems that problems of social integrity are endemic.118  
From a cost-benefit perspective, the effect of joint punishment will 
still be qualified by other conditions.  The first condition is whether 
the cost of such joint punishment and incentives can exceed the 
benefits from untrustworthiness, thus effectively deterring 
misbehavior.  The second condition is that the effectiveness of 
regulation depends not only on the intensity of law enforcement and 
punishment, but also on whether all behaviors of the untrustworthy 
are punished, that is, the rate of law enforcement.  The answers to 
these two questions require further empirical studies, which is not the 
concern of this paper. 
A much bigger question is that the integrity of society depends 
on many factors.  For example, the rate of enforcement of judicial 
decisions is just one indicator of judicial credibility; whether judicial 
decisions are reached in an impartial and objective way may be 
equally if not more important.  Likewise, the greater constraints on 
and punishment of untrustworthiness is obviously only one option to 
 
 118 See generally 2017 Nian Zhongguo Shehui Xinyong Tixi Jianshe Huigu yu 
2018 Nian Zhanwang (2017 年中国社会信用体系建设回顾与 2018 年展望) 
[Review of China’s Social Credit System Construction in 2017 and Outlook for 
2018], SOHU NEWS (May 4, 2019), https://www.sohu.com/a/311766653_774283 
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improve social integrity, but it is not the only option.  The Chinese 
government is not naive to rely entirely on the social credit system to 
improve social integrity, but also includes educating measures and 
other incentives into the OCSCS.  However, compared to other 
institutions in the past, it is clear that blacklist and joint punishment 
are the most important innovations under the social credit system.  
Even if social integrity is improved due to the social credit system, 
such integrity is achieved mainly through coercion, not voluntariness.  
This kind of morality through state intervention, 119  if it cannot 
somehow be transformed into genuine self-awareness and conscious 
action, will eventually become the moral tyranny of power.  The 
current social credit system aims to solve the problem of lack of 
integrity in an anonymous society by means of de-anonymization.  
Thus, the real test is when this condition of de-anonymization does 
not exist, whether the integrity of the society will still maintain at a 
high level.  That is not an easy question to answer without further 
observation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
China’s current social credit engineering is to alleviate, if not 
to solve, the serious lack of integrity of society with the recent 
development of information technology.  The system uses ever more 
broad social credit disclosure and sharing (blacklisting) and greater 
constraints and incentives (joint rewards and punishments) to solve 
the information asymmetry and uncertainties.  Though the Chinese 
social credit system includes market credit and is trying to combine 
the databases of different areas, its major concern is public credit, 
together with government integrity and judicial credibility.  Even 
though public credit and market credit share the same two-level 
structure in common, the differences between them are more 
important.  However, in practice, public credit and market credit are 
often confused, which leads to many misunderstandings. 
It is true that China’s social credit system has not yet 
developed to the extent of scoring and grading each credit subject 
nationally, but information technology makes a big data-driven and 
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https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175792 
[https://perma.cc/8UE9-RCDN]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
2021] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 327 
 
algorithm-based governance possible.  The pilot and model programs 
in some localities have been inspired by market credit and followed 
such a maximum data collection model, with the output of 
comprehensive social credit grades or scores.  The data and algorithm 
of such a maximum model have their own problems, like relevance, 
completeness, commensurability, interpretation, and discrimination.  
Besides the impossibility of a maximum model, it is also undesirable 
because of various human dignity concerns.  On the other end, the 
minimum model, though not exempted from problems, seems less 
problematic in this regard, with the output of a negative blacklist. 
It is technological change that makes the current social credit 
system different from those in the past.  The related regulatory 
function at first does not seem as innovative as perhaps assumed.  In 
reality, technological changes raise new concerns about the 
regulatory function, which need to be addressed before the system 
can be well established.  Because blacklisting and joint punishment 
have a significant influence on the subject and have the potential to 
operate across sectors and jurisdictions, there is a great need for 
further justification from both a normative and substantive standpoint.  
Finally, the increasing automation of blacklisting and joint 
punishment makes it essential to give the subject greater due process 
protections. 
The social credit system, as this paper has argued, is one 
possible means to improve social integrity through blacklisting and 
joint punishment, but there are a multitude of other factors that may 
influence the social integrity as well.  As the new social credit system 
takes shape, its full effect is still to be observed. 
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